

How Terrorist Groups End

Studies of the Twentieth Century

Christopher C. Harmon

TERRORISM STUDIES are far too young to have their Arnold Toynbee. At this writing there remains a need for broad and searching inquiries into why and how terror groups have declined or ended. The project requires detailed knowledge of scores of important groups, extant and extinct, worldwide. It also demands originality. This article reluctantly sets aside the useful framework developed in 2003 and worked publicly for five years.¹ A fresh approach in this vital field will help with understanding what we expect in the twenty-first century. This article begins with a look at early forms of violence in the twentieth century and proceeds to specific examples in the American experience. Revolutionaries of the 1960s and terroristic religious groups are also addressed. Finally, the project presents a nine-part framework for understanding terrorist groups.

Early Forms of Violence

The twentieth century inherited several forms of violence that would dramatically influence politics and terrorism. Three important and very different ones were labor militancy, anarchism, and communism. Each of these schools of thought and action profited from liberalism and rationalism, was internationalist, and by degrees, each supported workers and the poor. The most honest and credible of the three was labor—the drive for the rights and wages of blue-collar working men,

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women, and children but a drive that sometimes assumed violent means and took innocent lives.

Labor Militancy and Violence

International labor organizations arose from, and sometimes parallel to, older national and more-local models. Their members were overwhelmingly partisans of a fair wage, decent hours, and protecting children from brutal factory work or endless hours. Some activists, however, stepped well over the lines of public pressure and civil opposition. Individual militants or groups of organized laborers undertook the beating or killing of bosses, night watchmen, or “big capitalists.” Cities as different as Seattle and New York witnessed laborites’ assaults on the innocent. A few representatives for a union of iron workers and bridge builders coordinated an ugly bombing campaign in the United States in the fall of 1910 that took two dozen lives, injured others, and massively damaged property.² The labor movements also produced theorists and public advocates (e.g., Georges Sorel in France). They advocated violence—usually accompanied by other political aims and strategies that might appeal to the sympathetic mind and to the average citizen.

American labor violence succeeded, in its way, according to the best US historian of terrorist movements, Walter Laqueur. “The daily wage of American iron workers (AFL) went up from \$2.00 to \$4.30 (for shorter hours) between 1905 and 1910 as the result of the bombing of some one hundred buildings and bridges.”³ To violence and that powerful display—the strike—labor militants added mediation, sweet reason, unions, and other factors. These combinations improved labor conditions and pay. There was steady growth and legitimization of unions. Over the decades, sporadic labor violence did not end, but it came to be seen in the American public mind as separate from political notions such as anarcho-syndicalism or communism. These are all reasons labor violence overturned so few economies and political orders of the early twentieth century.

Anarchism

Although it often lauded the poor man or hated the rich man, anarchism was never essentially and directly about conditions in the workplace or the economy. It was obsessed with the state itself more than the state of the working man. Anarchism despises political authority as inherently

repressive and antihuman; it thus drives to bring down government—all government. In the last third of the nineteenth century and the early twentieth, anarchism was distinctively international, for reasons that were philosophical, first, and operational, second. The revolutionary concepts were exported, and the colluders turned up to write, preach, and kill in the United States, Italy, Spain, Germany, and France. International anarchists believed they could win; they could at least kill and could reduce a city to general fear. Historian Barbara Tuchman depicts Paris at one time in the grip of “mad bombers”—streets deserted, shops shuttered, panic evident in the public.⁴

Why did this anarchist movement die? Indeed it did end; incidents of violence fell off dramatically in Italy and France after 1900. In the United States, the movement appeared to peak about 1908 and touched another summit in 1919, but one hears little of new lethal attacks after 1920. It is also important to recognize that it was a movement—not a freakish wave of public interest, or a political party, or a disciplined formation of cells. Anarchism was international, it was networked (to use a modern term), ideas drove the actors, there were clandestine levels as well as public faces, some adherents were lethal, and some were utterly fearless. For these reasons, the movement suggests parallels with the contemporary Salafist Islamic movement—best known for the much-narrower al-Qaeda organization—thus, how it perished is doubly important.

New studies of terrorists by Richard Bach Jensen and Ersel Aydinli demonstrate how state intelligence units, policing agencies, and other governmental offices and legislatures had profoundly important roles. Italy and Russia took leads in multistate action to coordinate border control and extradition. American cooperation with foreign states became a reality while creating the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) at home to help develop a national register, allowing information exchange and coordination across hundreds of local, county, and state jurisdictional lines. Europeans adjusted internal laws, as in banning open anarchist meetings and enhancing court powers over conspiracy (i.e., revolutionary activities short of attacks). Russian services performed ruthlessly, locking up suspects and executing anarchists. In short, governments worldwide stiffly countered the anarchists.

Communism

The twentieth century lived with and endured communism. Witnesses, participants, and victims saw communism's stages of nascence, its rise to power, its dangerous status as delibrator over half the world during the Cold War and its sudden decline in authority by 1990. It is errant to assume, however, that late-twentieth-century communist terrorist groups all fell with the Soviet bloc in 1989–1990. First, many communist militants fought on, such as Revolutionary Organization 17 November (N17) in Greece. It was never touched by the Greek state and was indeed only broken by a bomber's accident in 2002, allowing a wave of arrests.⁵ Second, some state-supported communist groups fought on and *live even now*: the National Liberation Army (ELN) in Colombia long ago became self-supporting, has outlasted the Soviet bloc by two decades, and keeps several thousand men and women in the field. Third, certain communist groups did not fall with the Kremlin but perished well *before*. This was true of the Belgian Communist Combatant Cells. Most Italian leftist terror groups disappeared before 1990. Law enforcement was the usual primary reason.

The German Red Army Faction (RAF), or Baader-Meinhof group, did not announce its dissolution and failure in a communiqué until April 1992, proximate to the world-shaking fall of the wall, but the group's real end was signaled as early as 18 October 1977. On that day, four of the imprisoned RAF leaders attempted suicide (three succeeded). The Lufthansa jet their comrades had hijacked to bargain for the freedom of the prisoners in Stammheim jail was recaptured by elite West German border guards (GSG-9), who shot all the hijackers. With only a handful of quarrelsome confreres still operating inside the Federal Republic, the RAF experienced despair. After eight years of terrorism, they had made astonishingly few allies among 60 million normal Germans—people whose lives were democratic, whose self-governance centered in Bonn and more local places, and whose economy was a shining success. The RAF thus tottered along after 1990, but few new members joined, and nearly all who did were uncovered by diligent police work.⁶

Similar diligence by security forces and governments in France, Belgium, and Italy undercut and effaced those countries' "fighting communist organizations."⁷ Regional cooperation by authorities developed as well.⁸ Proper extraditions of fugitives thus gradually trumped older presumptions of the "asylum rights" of political terrorists, which had made violent refugees challenging to find.

Today communism is exhausted in most locales, but it has not died. “Naxalites” dominate parts of central-eastern India. Counterparts of a Maoist calling have reached a peak of power in Nepal, entered parliament, and taken the prime ministry, shelving terrorist methods—at least in most places, at least for now. Their terrorism has been placed on “pause” while they share power. Colombia has badly damaged the ELN and Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)⁹ regions, but neither insurgency is at an end. Peru’s Sendero Luminoso, or Shining Path, decapitated by 1992 arrests, cannot live up to reports of a “comeback” after a decade and a half of impotence. Most of these latter-twentieth-century communist organizations failed for two fundamental reasons. First, they could not successfully challenge the post–World War II success of capitalism and democracy. Second, as Lenin and Mao predicted, sporadic violence by small cells was unlikely to enjoy strategic success unless fully integrated with broader political and economic plans. In Europe, the United States, and some other regions, factors—including the collapse of the Soviet Union—have persuaded most that communism has little future and, thus, that its violent methods cannot be justified.

Ghosts in the American Experience

Unfortunately, racism and terrorism from the extreme right in America have never been limited to the Ku Klux Klan network. There is a lengthy and distressing chronicle of maiming, menacing, and, occasionally, even murder of the innocent by other US groups preaching narrow or eccentric forms of white power religion and politics. Tiny political minorities and “lone wolf” actors—militants, usually male—tend to imagine themselves as heroic defenders of the racial majority in the 50 states. In a testament to the significance of ideas—not just personalities—in terrorism, at least five acts of terrorism are linked to the ugly racist novel, *The Turner Diaries*.¹⁰ What social and political forces contain and resist this modern-day terrorism from the racist right? One is leadership from Washington, be it in federal statutes or action against entrenched resistance in some states and localities.¹¹ Successive US presidents, the Justice Department, and other organs of federal power used law, administration, rhetoric, and, occasionally, the deployment of soldiers to check violence and dampen the resistance of white citizens and institutions opposed to racial equality.

Federal power has not ended the Klan or most related organizations, but it damages their prestige, discourages activists, and demonstrates their weaknesses.

Public opinion has been even more important. Evolution, not revolution, moved Americans toward fuller racial equality. Education, religion, and common sense played their parts. Overt public resistance has been common all across America as racism is despised.¹² A third factor in the “containment” of such terrorism in the United States is the private legal suit. In singular victories that have come in a slow and compelling parade, civil suits are now used by public interest groups—usually in federal courts—to break individual terrorist organizations and hate groups.

Outside the United States, racism, neofascism, and extreme nationalism have many homelands and occasionally spawn terrorism. The group Blood & Honour keeps alive the Nazi flame, with members or affiliates in a number of European Union countries and the United States.¹³ Rightist extremism has by no means ended in Europe, although it does not regularly lead to terrorism, nor is it as dangerous now as certain other terrorist ideologies.

More from the Left: Revolutionaries of the 1960s and Beyond

Scores of Che Guevarist-type groups came and went, unsuccessfully and swiftly, especially on the Latin American scene. Two of the continent’s most celebrated terrorist groups—in Uruguay and Argentina, respectively—enjoyed years of success until the military intervened and conducted systematic repression with all available assets; that is, powerful terrorists were defeated by greater powers. Uruguay’s bout with the Tupamaros began in 1962. Uruguayan armed forces intervened in April 1972 and soon captured key revolutionary leaders, as well as hundreds of cadre, and killed many Tupamaro gunmen. This was decisive; after 1973 the movement was never able to reorganize, and after 1976 it had no serious presence at all. The Tupamaros had a successful run for about a decade and disappeared. Uruguay’s armed forces defeated them and, years later, withdrew and handed government back over to civilian authorities. A once-flourishing democracy was thus returned to the democratic fold.¹⁴ Some old Tupamaros are in pacific politics today.

Full-blooded state reaction also crushed the Montoneros in Argentina. Their terrorist ideology blended nationalism with Marxist-Leninism and

populism, finding a balance of motives that accorded well with political trends in that country. A series of spectacular actions occurred in 1974, but this marked the apex of success for the revolutionaries, as it led directly to a military decision for intervention. For several months, multiple and often ugly methods were deployed to exterminate this powerful underground.

The Latin world of the late 1960s and 1970s saw the rise and fall of many other groups, including the National Liberation Action (ALN) organization of Carlos Marighella. He turned from mainstream Brazilian communism to terrorist work and published the 1969 pamphlet *Minimannual of the Urban Guerrilla*. Then he perished almost immediately in a gun battle with police. His successor lasted only months, and ALN disappeared. The fall of many such short-lived groups makes clear the pattern. Force was met with force, be it legal, covert, or martial. Latin America saw some cases of state appeasement of terrorists but few instances of successful negotiation leading to satisfactory settlements. Most of the challengers to government were advocates of “absolute war;” they were serious revolutionaries in a hunt for state power, not compromise and not limited reforms in favor of the poor or the workers. Terrorist parties of this time were creative, exciting to some citizens, and often well led by charismatic figures or well-educated propagandists, or both, making them strong enemies. As such, Latin states tended to reply slowly but ultimately with great harshness. In Guatemala and Argentina, especially, the government offensive came with free use of torture and extrajudicial killing.¹⁵ Attrition of the terrorists and victory for the state were normal outcomes. The pattern would remain during much of the 1980s and 1990s, as we shall see, but with two notable differences: efforts at negotiation would become more common; and in certain cases, numbers of Latin undergrounders would fold pacifically into overt political parties, shaping their ambitions in more legitimate fashions. The Colombian M-19 and Salvadoran Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) cadre would do so, following defeats in the fields.

Events in Latin America had strong parallels in Western Europe by 1968. Anarchism reappeared in major cities after decades of absence and to a degree not known in Latin America. Michael “Bommi” Baumann’s June 2 Movement in Germany helped reopen wars of youth, radicalism, and criminality against order. His mindless book of those days, *Terror or Love?*, suggests the lack of strategy in his political circle in Berlin and thus anticipates the decline and failure of that dimension of the urban and student movement. Joschka Fischer and Daniel Cohn-Bendit did

not do notably better in Frankfurt. These self-declared *Sponti*, or spontaneous ones, unrestricted by Leninist ideas of planning and revolutionary organization, attracted attention and sympathy—and police brutality on occasion—but never persuaded the German people that they were all “latent fascists.” A concentrated multiyear effort to infiltrate a large Opel car factory and bring about a workers’ rebellion flopped due to immaturity of technique.¹⁶ Anarchism failed in northern Europe in the 1960s and 1970s, unless a loosening of lifestyles and culture is taken as the only standard of success. Fischer’s career shows one way terrorists end: folding into pacific life. He moved away from the violent underworld and sympathies for armed terrorism toward the Green Party and elections, even becoming the Federal Republic’s foreign minister (1998–2005). Both Fischer and Cohn-Bendit appear regularly in the newspapers, but as personalities and politicos rather than street fighters.

Europe’s communist terrorist groups were more successful, longer lived, and found more mainstream supporters than competing anarchist groups. Italy’s communists make for remarkable study. Prima Linea, or Front Line, was a large terrorist organization and force of the underground. Trotskyite and Maoist parties abounded, inside and outside the law. Lotta Continua, or Permanent Struggle, boasted some 200,000 adherents. The Red Brigades had “columns” in Rome, Florence, Turin, and Milan, even if the last of those turned restless and broke away, taking money and guns with them. Incident levels in Italy rose to shocking heights in the 1970s; there was chaos—perceived and actual—through the early 1980s. Such power in terrorist hands is always to be judged in relation to other political power; in Italy, central government was weak after decades of tumultuous parliamentary politics, enhanced Communist Party strength, and voter disillusionment with such matters as organized crime. Instead of teaching the value of democracy and the mechanisms of rule of law, some social science faculty were poisoning students with contempt of country. A powerful press like the Milan-based Feltrinelli’s was no bulwark of the establishment; its heir, Giangiacomo Feltrinelli, was a paymaster of terrorists.¹⁷ Hard-working Italian politicians who labored to build working coalitions of disparate parties failed more often than succeeded, and when Christian Democrat Aldo Moro built a bridge to the legal communists left in 1978, the Red Brigades immediately murdered him for it.

In hindsight, Italian incident levels make it almost incredible that republican democracy survived. That it did, and without even one month

of tyranny, is a lesson for all times. No dazzling new computer software or police science was the key. No one leader from the political parties took the helm and showed the way. Security forces were key—but not the only answer. The country's response was a hesitating and disjointed one, but it did succeed. Legislators studied and improved the laws on terrorism in several key ways.¹⁸ By law, police were given greater powers to investigate and to detain suspects. A new group of judges was created to specialize in prosecuting terrorists—as also occurred in France. Terrorism ceased to be considered an anomaly, or a quirky expression of libertines, and became a named offense in state codes. A new provision, however, pointed the terrorists toward a “golden bridge,” even as it threatened longer years in jail and encircled their rear with policemen: this allowed those who confessed and aided police to dramatically reduce their own sentences. This last point capitalized on the very size of the underground by giving openings to weaker cadre. The terrorist movement contained not just hardened men and women but also softer adherents or comrades grown weary; some of these were willing to talk when captured. *Pentiti* testimony locked up comrades for decades, and the more they gave away, the more the rigor of the remaining terrorists generally dissolved. This phenomenon illustrated the vulnerabilities of terror groups that sought to become broad insurgencies; counterintelligence and discipline problems escalated with growth. Combinations of legal punches and law enforcement knocked down so many Italian leftist terrorists during the four years 1979 to 1982. Italy also deployed a specialized police unit, which in 1982 freed NATO's Gen James Dozier from a Padua apartment staffed by Brigadists. Incident chronicles then fell nearly silent for the Red Brigades columns; most notations were of arrests of undergrounders, not attacks.¹⁹

In North America the early 1970s were notable for their violence. This followed the rise in civil rights activism and included several hideous murders of these activists by right-wingers. Problems were illuminated by arson and rioting in major US cities. The Vietnam War was a second source of domestic violence for Americans and Canadians.

The Quebec Liberation Front (FLQ) operated from 1963 into 1972. This nationalist, separatist, and leftist group was among the first active in the northern hemisphere. It broke away from a larger leftist group and took aim at military establishments and US economic and political influence in Canada. Evading police, one young leader returned to his native Belgium, while Raymond Villeneuve made a pilgrimage to Cuba, helping

initiate a long relationship between that island state and North American leftists going underground or seeking to land airplanes they hijacked. The organization survived initial police reaction, found support in anti-Ottawa sentiment in the French-speaking region, published the journal *La Cognee (The Axe)*, and engaged new members such as part-time journalist Pierre Vallieres to write propaganda.²⁰

Robberies and kidnappings built toward a peak between the summers of 1968 and 1969; there were 100 bombings, including the Montreal Stock Exchange. These produced vigorous police action by a government long known as quiescent and liberal. In 1970, the FLQ overreached with an elaborate plot to seize a British trade commissioner and swap him for prisoners. As this fell into shambles, the FLQ also seized Vice Premier and Labor Minister Pierre Laporte—soon strangled. Quebecois separatism prompted the Canadian government to rediscover a World War I-era “War Measures Act” that now allowed a range of state actions. Authorities introduced, against fellow Canadian citizens, such methods as agent provocateurs, systematic intelligence work, countless arrests, and detention without trial. Hundreds of FLQ cadre or sympathizers were entrapped. Within months the cause had been stalled; the country had become silent. Separatism still watered the soil of Quebecoise nationalism but in legal and fruitful channels, yielding election of the socialist and former separatist Pierre Trudeau as prime minister in 1968. This victory by a leader that the FLQ’s Vallieres had mocked as a slavish compromiser could just as well be said to show how the democratic path can be an effective path—that a forgiving and undisciplined political culture (such as that of Weimar Germany) need not invite the empowerment of thugs (such as Nazis). Quebec separatists won “half a loaf,” and it seems difficult to deny that terrorism was one cause of the change.²¹ Now the separatist cause seems sated; polling gives few indications of support for violence to further set the region apart from Canada. Terrorism ended in a combination of intelligence work, harsh law enforcement, and political accommodation.

Puerto Rico offers a related case in which serious cultural, linguistic, and political differences may threaten division from a larger, multinational country in North America. United States control of the island in the Caribbean dates from its war with Spain; Puerto Rico was a sort of spoil of war. Advocates of total independence have never been able to capture more than a bare minimum of the island’s votes, but their track record of violent provocations is lengthy, reaching back to 1950, when they

nearly assassinated Pres. Harry Truman, and 1954, when they shot up the US House of Representatives. Arrests ended these cells; however, the thoughts and resentments that sparked the cases smoldered as embers and produced new flames in 1974 when the Armed Forces of National Liberation (FALN) appeared. They stunned New York City with a tavern bombing; incendiaries were laid in department stores, and dozens of attacks followed. The action then jumped from the eastern United States to Puerto Rico itself, opening a fresh front. Arrests and convictions, as of 10 perpetrators in December 1980, squelched the drive. Some argue that the group ended in 1982; certainly after 1983 there was little to keep the FALN name in lights. Policing succeeded.

The FALN case reveals the difference between a campaign and a war. One militant Puerto Rican campaign was finished—but not the war. A very similar group had been founded in 1978 and proved well prepared to succeed the faltering FALN. They called themselves Los Macheteros. Mixing leftism and nationalism, the new group was an ally of the Marxist-Leninist Puerto Rican Socialist Party (PSP), which itself had connections to Cuba. In 1978 the Macheteros staged simultaneous incendiary attacks on nine US combat planes at a military base near Isla Verde International Airport. Five years later, having placed a member inside the workings of the Brinks armored car service in Hartford, Connecticut, they escaped with \$7.2 million. Some of it emerged in Robin Hood–style giveaways in Puerto Rican communities; some of it doubtless bought weapons and supplies; much of it appears to have gone to Cuba in a vehicle driven over the US border with Mexico.

The FBI took apart Los Macheteros with the same patience and thoroughness it would show later against rightists and “militiamen” in the US “patriot movement” of the 1990s. With surveillance, wiretaps, and other efforts (not to mention the special energy of an organization whose office in San Juan had been rocketed by Macheteros), the FBI disassembled this organization, brought its people to trial, and exacted lengthy sentences. Women and men, activists and journalists, social workers, and a Harvard University man were convicted in the late 1980s. The effect on the group was nearly terminal. There did remain Filiberto Ojeda Rios, a longtime Machetero leader. In 2005 the FBI found him, armed, in a house on the island; he died in the subsequent gunfight.²² Los Macheteros may be counted among the “deceased” of late-twentieth-century terrorist organs.

The proximate cause of their expiry was devoted work by law enforcement and successful trials.

After a century of using Vieques as a bombing and gunnery range, the US Navy ceased such practices, removing one cause of discontent in Puerto Rico. Perhaps a larger cause of the near-total containment of terrorism by the government has been inadequate support for it by other Puerto Ricans. The island of four million people,²³ as a whole, neither votes for nor supports bombings and killings for independence. There is no mass support, above or below the political ground level. On the other hand, Los Macheteros was a success for some years. Preceding it came other waves in this pool of ethnic and nationalist resentments, which may well be stirred by further storms.

As the twentieth century closed, another nationalist-separatist fighting force with long tenure and a solid level of performance and skill seemed in profound trouble. Basque Homeland and Freedom (ETA) in Spain still has fighters in the field and other operational capacities but is at an all-time point of weakness. It survives, but barely; it strikes against Spain, but rarely; it makes headlines, but usually for capture of ETA shooters or financiers by the more clever security forces of Madrid or Paris. The ETA is still standing but may be on its last legs. If the ETA ends, it would be significant to *world* terrorism: the group is a half century old, has killed nearly 900 Spanish in its operations, and has represented a model and been an occasional partner to other terror groups. Among its successes must be counted the attraction of foreign support—guns from Libya, perhaps advice from Soviet agents, certainly training grounds in Soviet bloc client-state South Yemen in the 1970s—without ever being soiled in its image as an indigenous and independent revolutionary force. This is a difficult balance to strike, but the ETA has done it well.

Formed at the end of the 1950s, the ETA focused on propaganda and political front activities, initiating systematic violence only years later. Principal Spanish political and security force personnel and *Guardia Civil* gendarmerie were the usual victims. Shooting was a preferred method; later would come the car bombs, with their far wider swathes of “collateral damage” to other Spaniards. Assigning a “revolutionary tax” to Basques who were, and were not, engaged in revolution was an innovative and successful financing means the group has never abandoned. But weaknesses were also present. Internecine quarreling over ideology plagued the early decades, with some leaders favoring pure nationalism, while another

strong wing wanted to rally behind declarations of communism and global revolution. Two larger problems were also political. First, Spain emerged as a strong democracy as the death of Francisco Franco in 1975 led to the benign monarchy of King Juan Carlos, who transferred some powers to the National Assembly. Second, in a move largely ignored by the outside world, the central government bestowed on the Basque lands a high degree of autonomy as to culture, local law, and language. The ETA reacted violently, probably sensing the subtle dangers (to a terrorist movement) in this prudent concession by Madrid. Over time the government reform had effect, helping to divide the ordinary Basque from his confrere in the terrorist underground.

Today the political fronts that were once so helpful to supporting ETA violence are gravely weakened. Several have been banned by Madrid, including Herri Batasuna (Popular Unity), which in the early 1980s was second in strength among Spanish political parties. Herri Batasuna changed its name to Batasuna, only to again be proscribed. In 2007–2009 the most noted spokesman for the front, Arnaldo Otegi, was under intense police pressure. The larger political challenge is that typical Basques no longer respond to ETA battle cries; indeed, the largest parade on the nationalist issue the country has seen in recent years occurred in January 2007, and it was *against* ETA terrorism.²⁴ A final problem is almost overwhelming for the dwindling ranks of ETA terrorists: Franco-Spanish cooperation is at all-time highs. The president of France and the prime minister of Spain met in Élysée Palace in January 2008 and have gone so far as to create a small binational policing unit.²⁵ This now continuous binational cooperation and other dimensions of good grand strategy are wrecking the ETA.

Two other famous and long-standing terrorist entities might have been comparatively studied until May 2009. Both were Marxist-Leninist; both had enjoyed protracted periods of leadership continuity; both were wealthy; they had been successful as insurgents and leaders of “shadow governments,” protecting large swaths of territory, and were thus much more than “bite and flee” attackers of civilian and military targets. Mao Tse-tung’s “phase two” warfare, combining guerrilla efforts with semi-conventional and positional warfare,²⁶ is the best descriptor of the nature of these two very important organizations. The FARC communists of Colombia and the LTTE (Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam) separatists and communists in Sri Lanka have been feared for their skills in varieties of fighting and terrorism. Now the latter appears finished, but the

Colombian government must be especially careful. One of the common sins of counterinsurgency is overestimating successes, of which there were many during 2007 and 2008. Bogota has more to do, and Colombia's president will soon complete his second and final term of office.

After 2001 the government and armed forces of Sri Lanka were seized with a profound determination that has resonated with their polity and allowed a concerted national effort against a powerful in-country enemy. The 1980s and 1990s had seen many ground battles, which together with LTTE terrorism had left over 65,000 dead. A negotiated peace made for a few quiet years but was overturned in 2006 and replaced by the most intense fighting. Advances by government ground forces and the recapture of key towns occurred in late 2008; the spring of 2009 brought the killing of leader Velupillai Prabhakaran. Leadership and fine armed forces wrecked the guerrillas and terrorists of the LTTE. After 35 indomitable years, Prabhakaran and many top officers are gone.

Some Groups of Religious Bent

Terrorism is always political. In the late twentieth century it also became more religious. The 1970s and 1980s offered several extreme versions of Christianity and Hinduism, which caught up "true believers" in militancy. Sikh sects were active—and killing—internationally in the mid 1980s.²⁷ There was long-running violence from the Jewish Defense League in the eastern United States. By 1988 one could discern newer groups of religious bent—or bent religion. A majority of the new groups founded since 1990 avow religious objectives—in front of, or parallel to, political ones.²⁸ Most such groups deserve to be taken at their word. Iran's officials supported (then and now) groups of both Sunni and Shia faiths. Beneficiaries include HAMAS, which in its well-crafted charter took an integrated approach to conceptual support for struggle and violence that combined ideas of Sunni Islamism in the realms of politics, culture, society, even the arts and the place of women. There are, newly in evidence, many more religion-inspired political movements in the traditional "arc of crisis" from North Africa through the greater Middle East into Afghanistan and Pakistan.

The 1990s also saw the crest of Aum Shinrikyo (Supreme Truth), strong in Japan and Russia. It offered an eccentric mix of worship of Shiva (Hindu goddess of destruction), certain precepts of Buddhism, fashionable mysti-

cism and self-help, and the claims to deity of its founder, Shoko Asahara. Among other innovations, Asahara expanded the Buddhist precept of *pōa* into an excuse for mass killing for the “altruistic” purpose of releasing souls for reincarnation in higher forms and better status.²⁹

Such perverse ideas amid a cult of personality led directly to some of the first uses of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) by a substate actor. Asahara had not always obsessed over WMDs, but his views darkened dramatically after efforts to compete in political elections to Japan’s Diet in February 1990 brought in few votes. Humiliation set arrogance and self-interest together on the road to terrorism and, ultimately, mass murder. Asahara hastened his scientific programs, which came to include beam weapons, Ebola virus, and efforts to acquire uranium. Aum conducted its first WMD attack in April 1990—with botulism. Another dozen WMD attacks of varying type and considerable originality followed, including the use of botulinum toxin against the Imperial Palace in 1993, a killing with sarin in Matsumoto in June 1994, and a subway attack the next year with briefcases dispensing toxin (botulism, again) through built-in fans. More failed than succeeded, but all prepared the cult well for 20 March 1995 and success with sarin on subways. The world was amazed as Tokyo lay stunned. Maiming more than it killed, the gas traumatized the Japanese national psyche.³⁰

Aum’s strengths included fanaticism peculiarly combined with the high education levels and scientific training of many top cadres. There was also a fruitful collaboration with Russia. Thousands joined in that country, but more importantly, high-level military and government and scientific circles in Russia sold or gave Aum many valued prizes, from commando training by former KGB experts to a military helicopter to a formula for sarin.³¹ Finally, there was the remarkable budget of the cult and its enormous infrastructure, especially in Japan; these were massive and doubtless helped with political influence and deterred punitive suits. But the most important of Aum’s strengths, the one that most prolonged its life prior to 1995, was Japanese tolerance. A society long known to permit or indulge religious societies and cults, Japan is also a liberal democracy as hesitant as postwar Germany to display a heavy hand in domestic or foreign affairs. This religious, social, and political tolerance was stretched beyond all limits as Aum increasingly preyed upon wider circles of Japanese civilians in the early 1990s. There were kidnappings, druggings, shamelessly inept “medical treatments” in their clinics, disciplinary murders, illegal disposal

of corpses, and outright attacks on public figures such as a judge who had made anti-Aum rulings in property cases.

The cult's weaknesses, by contrast, were few. Aum required a relative minimum of members, being flamingly elitist in its practices and planning. If public support could not be mustered in elections, it was enough to have the public ignore most of the cult's actions. Even the visions of the apocalypse that darkened Asahara's mind were a source of certain strengths, forcing cohesion, permitting discipline, and eliciting tremendously long work hours from members. Only the excess of terrorist killing in the final, successful sarin attack brought about the group's end. Once government and police were confronted with the act of 20 March 1995, they snapped to attention and dismantled the decade-old organization. Japan arrested some 400 members; thousands quit on their own. The guru founder and many top leaders went to prison. Administrative proceedings immediately placed Aum in formal bankruptcy, although their legal charter to exist was not revoked, it seems. One can argue that Aum was decapitated by arrests.

Some Japanese security officials think Aum's successor "Aleph" bears watching. If thousands of original members left the group in 1995, several hundred did not or later returned, including several top officials complicit in the former violence. These include Fumihiro Joyu, who was jailed for three years only to return, gain control of Aleph, and direct it for a half decade—until a March 2007 schism. None of the capital sentences for murder have been carried out, and many lesser Aum criminals have left jail. The new group is also rebuilding physical infrastructure. The shell company that made computers never disbanded in official bankruptcy proceedings by the state and was soon prospering again, with tens of millions of dollars in sales by the late 1990s. In 2002, *Kyodo News* reported that such sales and the way Aleph "places the highest level of importance on developing cyber skills" and "identifies itself as a cyber cult" were reasons for US intelligence concern about a cyber attack by the group.³² As of 2005, Aleph owned 26 facilities as well as another 120 residences, according to Japan's national police, and 650 members were living collectively in compounds. Canada, the United States, and the European Union all classify Aleph as a terrorist organization.

Other religious terrorist groups of the late twentieth century have not merely evaded arrest for their crimes; they have flourished. Hezbollah was born among Lebanese Shia in 1982, and HAMAS is a Palestinian Sunni counterpart begun some five years later. The trajectory of each helps explain

(1) how religion works with politics to produce successful terrorist organizations, and (2) how some terror groups end in success—both have achieved political power by degrees, even if their ultimate objects have not been won. Hezbollah and HAMAS are sophisticated and dangerous.

The so-called Party of God (Hezbollah) began by emphasizing a role as the “Organization of the Oppressed on Earth”—another of Hezbollah’s many names. It prudently never abandoned this arm of activity. Human needs are abundant in Beirut’s Shia slums, and Hezbollah’s effective shadow government is at work nourishing, nursing, educating, and propagandizing among those people. Such labors have always helped to make people ignore the rank hubris in calling itself “The Party of God,” on the one hand, and have helped to justify and excuse its terrorism, on the other. Indeed, the infamy of the 1980s’ days of kidnapping, torturing, and killing hostages—including Germans, Frenchmen, and Americans—has all but passed out of today’s parlance; it has been some time since Hezbollah acted in such ways against Westerners. Even after the death of intelligence chief Imad Mughniyah (in Syria in 2008), this remains an organization of capable terrorist operatives—but their emphasis is of other kinds: guerrilla war and politics.

Against any opponent, especially the Israeli Defense Force soldiers, the organization offers a sophisticated and developing array of methods and techniques, from well-disguised road bombs to antiship missiles to unmanned aerial vehicles (which may one day be armed). Several thousand men and women are armed by Hezbollah; many more thousands are trained or active supporters. Its discipline and ability has been recognizable to military analysts for a decade and a half and to the world after July 2006, when Hezbollah forces fired rockets into Israeli territory. Hezbollah has another arm, the political. Its skills well suit the freedoms of action offered in a relative vacuum of Lebanese life, where central government is weak and past official pronouncements about Hezbollah’s existence and de facto rivalry to the state are permissive or even apologetic.³³ Finally there is the media arm of Hezbollah: outlets led by *Al Manar* television. When Israeli bombs destroy the antennas or studios, *Al Manar* resurfaces—another proof of the way political infrastructure, religious motivation, and state sponsorship may enliven terror organizations under even the most intense pressure. Like the FARC in Colombia or the New People’s Army in the Philippines, the Party of God can seemingly absorb any number of

hard hits, year upon year, and carry on, planning for an indefinite future. Conceivably, Hezbollah might one day lead a Lebanese coalition government.

HAMAS, the Islamic Resistance Movement, was formed in late 1987 amid the clatter of stones and bullets in the First Intifada. Like Hezbollah, it enjoys huge subsidies from Iranian coffers—even while declining to walk the Shiite line in religious affairs.³⁴ Individuals and groups of Palestinian expatriates worldwide supply other money and aid, as from the United States, Europe, and the South American “Tri-Border Area.” Secular Syria gives fulsome support and always has, despite profound differences of political ideology. These Palestinian terrorists, politicos, and undergrounder began with the slingshot and the knife and graduated to an array of weapons, especially the vehicle bomb—yet another “lesson learned” by watching Hezbollah.

While HAMAS lacks its Lebanese counterpart’s skills in complex guerrilla war, it is possessed of a smooth and practiced political touch. It campaigns and competes well at the polls and did so long before stunning Fatah (and outside observers) with a January 2006 electoral victory in Gaza. That led in turn to a June 2007 formal political regime in Gaza that rivaled Fatah’s control of the West Bank and also allowed the periodic launching of rockets into Israeli towns.³⁵ “Owning” Gaza, HAMAS had the power to gather rockets, the ability to launch them, and the responsibility for the war they produced with Israel. The organization also defies decapitation efforts and continues its attacks on foreigners, especially Israelis, and its bloody rivalry with Fatah Palestinians. HAMAS has sums of both power and legitimacy—and grapples for more. In its charter, which lays down its views on society, religion, politics, the arts, and so forth, there is an absolute and oft-repeated proscription against compromise or any mediated solution to “the Palestinian problem,” which surrenders any authority over any part of the land.³⁶ Negotiations, not to mention pathways out of violence, are never easy. It is most challenging to make inroads with a religiously motivated terrorist clan; negotiations will not make HAMAS quit, or even quit fighting Fatah. The group is a success.

Terrorism in Nine Parts

A sweep of the twentieth century proffers innumerable examples for the study of how terror groups end. There are hundreds of terrorist groups—too many to master, or even mention, in one article. And there are many different ways to approach this considerable analytical challenge. Ex-

cluded here are several notable false starts, such as the odd notion that terror groups have a natural lifespan. Arguing for the latter ignores the varied and important factors that limit or enable terrorism, ranging from governmental responses to the internal and strategic choices leaders make.

Terrorism can be classified by the leading ways most groups meet their demise; for example: defeat by security forces, defeat by decapitating the leadership; defeat by government's good grand strategy, folding into pacific political life, or terrorist success. The present, more chronologically oriented approach shows a different aspect of terrorist groups. It comes to conclusions about a given group under a pair of analytical rubrics: duration of the group's life, with emphasis on significant actions or years of "main violence"; and extent of successful results. Studied under the first rubric (I) are terror groups whose campaigns are of short duration (five years or less). Groups that ran for a medium length (8–15 years) are rubric II. Rubric III shows protracted terrorist campaigners whose efforts last from two to five decades. With crosscutting analysis, we identify first, organizations that end in defeat; second, those that achieved or are achieving limited success; and third, groups that have largely succeeded or appear to enjoy strategic successes now. (See charts on pages 75, 76, and 77).³⁷

I. Short-Lived Organizations

Defeated. Scores of twentieth-century terrorist groups have had very brief life spans, as little as three to five years. This fact, and the swiftness with which the public forgets them, ought not to mean neglect of *how* they were defeated or brought into decline. Analysts and strategists have often declared that it is best if government can interrupt terrorism or insurgency in its incipient stages.

Among the first of these in post–World War II history was the Secret Army Organization, founded to save European settlers' status and French power in Algeria, but that totally failed within a year and a half—by mid 1962. Certain other European rightist groups were to have lifespans of similar brevity, or do only marginally better. In 1980, for example, there was the aforementioned neo-Nazi scare, a natural result of massive bombings in quick succession in Bologna, Munich, and Paris. The Paris assault, however, was by Palestinians using an invented French cover name, the Federation of National Action. In Germany the "Military Sports Group" of Karl Heinz Hoffman bombed the Oktoberfest in central Munich; a year later, this clan was on the ropes. Members went to the Near East

for Palestinian training and “were arrested on their return to the Federal Republic. . . . Hoffman was jailed in 1981, after which the group ceased to exist.”³⁸

American examples of total failure and precipitous decline are too numerous to chart. Illustrative are four groups of the 1970s and 1980s, at different ends of the ideological spectrum: the Symbionese Liberation Army, the United Freedom Front, the Order, and the Army of Aryan Resistance. The first two of these gun gangs were black-dominated leftists who held up banks and shot patrolmen while dreaming of status as a revolutionary vanguard. The other two were white-power groups on the political far right. None of these enjoyed even three good years of real power in their respective undergrounds. A common theme of such cases, in Europe and America, is good and aggressive police work and resultant attrition through both arrests and gun battles, sapping these secular, racist, and militant organizations.

Myriad fragments of militant life have burned briefly and expired shortly. Consider Latin America. In Bolivia, the endlessly romanticized Cuba veteran Che Guevara started a National Liberation Army that never exceeded 51 troops. It formed in 1966 only to see Che and another leader killed the next year. That drama inspired a successor in Brazil named the October 8 Revolutionary Movement, which was swiftly reduced to virtual invisibility by a wave of arrests in 1969. Later, as remnants folded back into Brazil’s official Communist Party,³⁹ a further Brazilian spore failed to flower, let alone take root: the National Liberating Action existed from 1968 until 1971.⁴⁰ Europe experienced many such flickers and flights. In Holland, long-gone entities include the Free South Moluccan Youth Organization (1975–1979) and Red Youth and Red Help groups of the early 1970s. Italy’s rightist Revolutionary Action Movement ran for only half a decade in the mid 1970s. There was the New Force, which lasted six years in Spain, passing from the scene in 1981, and Portugal’s yet-shorter-lived New Order. Belgium’s Communist Combatant Cells surely hold some form of European record for brevity. They operated only from October 1984 to December 1985, whereupon the arrest of all four members terminated their tactically effective campaign of two dozen nonlethal bombings of German, Belgian, and other NATO targets.⁴¹ Belgium went quiet, as before, and remained so.

Thus, a range of twentieth-century groups have been stalled or stopped cold in a few years. These include many secular ones, most of them communist. There are also several good right-wing terrorist examples.

Limited Success. The known terror groups of short duration were not all total failures, however; some can claim limited achievements, if only when judged by their own lights or the praise of their own community or prestigious mainstream partisans. It is reasonable to study the US Black Panthers in this way.⁴² Colombia offers its own case of a militant organization that began with claims of virtue, degenerated into crime and terrorism, and came to an end after a few short years: the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia anti-leftist militias. The leader disappeared, mysteriously and permanently, and the group demobilized after successful negotiations on amnesty with the government. This examination of terror groups yields few that are *both* short-lived and successful in limited ways. One is a leftist revolutionary and single-race organization in the United States, while the other is a broad “preservationist” terrorist organization that flourished in Colombia.

Successful. There are still fewer clear examples of terrorist movements of short duration that came to enjoy total success. Communism did win a violent triumph in Cuba, with remarkable swiftness; but most judge that success came far more from guerrilla war and political work than from terrorism.⁴³ If one leaves aside the Cuban case, there may be no short-lived classic terror organizations that succeeded so completely, in so brief a time.

II. Midterm Lifespans

Defeated. The twentieth century’s offerings under rubric II—medium-length terrorist campaigns—are numerous and varied. Some perish in exhaustion, be it physical, psychological, or organizational; an early post-World War II example was the fatigue of Luis Taruc’s Huks in the Philippines. Their insurgency and flagrant terrorism⁴⁴ ran hard into many obstacles, especially defense secretary and later president Ramon Magsaysay. This government wore out its enemy with sophisticated grand strategy. Good political leadership inspirited the new democracy. Fine intelligence work captured a full politburo in Manila. A clever “free land” program seduced away some Huk cadres and demoralized others by answering their calls for “land for the landless.” Well-trained, disciplined armed forces protected the Filipino people while hunting down terror cells. Eventually, the rural leadership under the labor activist turned communist Taruc capitulated.

The campaign ran from 1946 into 1955, a decade. Good leadership and good grand strategy defeated the Huks.⁴⁵

Other forms of terrorism in the Latin world of the 1960s through the 1980s lasted eight to 15 years until totally defeated. Many important and compelling revolutionary terrorist organizations were crushed by governmental force. These included the Tupamaros of Uruguay,⁴⁶ who prompted a military coup, and the Montoneros of Argentina, whose cells were ground to pieces by government networks of intelligence, police, and soldiers. El Salvador offers a different kind of case study. The FMLN, a front group of some five guerrilla groups deeply engaged in nationwide terrorism and semi-conventional battles against the military, was finally brought to an end, but not because their demands were satisfied, as one strangely errant new study claims.⁴⁷ It was due to a combination of Salvadoran government and military resistance, enormous financial and intelligence help and military aid from the United States, the decline of Soviet bloc aid, and the close and skillful diplomatic engagement of neighboring and international states in a regional peace process. The latter included the United Nations and states such as the United States, but the most important actors were Mexico and Contadora countries.⁴⁸ This last factor was very important. Like the negotiated conclusion of IRA Provo violence in Northern Ireland, it suggests that at the right moment, negotiation may offer opportunities, even with terrorist enemies.

Western Europeans also grappled with terrorism from the 1960s through the 1980s. Another dozen campaigns of medium length by self-avowed “urban guerrillas” unfolded in cities and towns but were doomed to defeat. The far left’s fascinating failures included the Turkish People’s Liberation Army (TPLA, 1969–1980); Portuguese of Popular Forces (1980–1986); German anarchists of the 2nd of June Movement (1971–1980); the Baader-Meinhofs in Germany, whose main violence ran from about 1968 to 1977; Front Line, in Italy (1976–1981);⁴⁹ and Action Direct in France (1979–1987). The Italian left was torn apart by dissidents and *pentiti* (repentants) who, under prudent new laws, offered testaments against their former colleagues in exchange for light sentences for themselves.⁵⁰ In most cases, the European Marxist-Leninist organizations were slowly ground down by civilian law enforcement. The TPLA was different; it was among the Turkish clandestine political organizations forcibly suppressed by a 1980 military coup. The Army took power, defeated many terrorist groups, and ceded control back to civilian authorities.

A few of these rubric II groups (8 to 15 years of major violence) have a longer, less-crisp profile: they rose, fell, and yet still defy eradication. Peru's Sendero Luminoso has existed since the early 1970s and determined upon armed resistance in 1977 but did not openly attack until 1980. Thirteen years later, the gravest of blows reversed its rise toward national power. In September 1992, a tiny police intelligence unit located leader Abimael Guzman and made an arrest; he has since been locked up on an island under Navy control. In practical terms, the Sendero Luminoso campaign ended there, but the insurgency had sunk roots, and a scattering of militants never left the field. As a hardened Maoist, Guzman would know the stories of the twentieth-century "comebacks" after jail or hardship—Adolf Hitler, "Long March" leader Mao Tse-tung, Mahatma Gandhi, Nelson Mandela, and others. So, while the self-described "Fourth Sword of Marxism" kept to his cell during the 1990s, a few remnants stumbled along the shining path of continuous revolution, enlivened by the obvious limitations of Peru's central government and unchallenged by rivals on the left. In 2007 and then 2008, a few reporters stretched to insist that Sendero is reviving.⁵¹ More conservatively, we argue that its ideological convictions have allowed it to fail without disappearing. Meanwhile, Shining Path's former leftist nemesis, the Túpac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA), has totally disappeared. It was weakened in the mid 1990s and crushed by government security forces in 1997.

There are many "studies in defeat" for groups of midterm duration. All imaginable ideological categories are included: leftist, odd combinations of left and right, a religious cult, and others. Some of these groups are mostly urban in their focus, but the range includes many insurgencies as well.

Limited Success. There are also examples of terrorist groups that practiced violence for eight to 15 years and ceased operations with a feeling of considerable (but not total) success. Some of these existed in the Eastern Mediterranean as anti-British Empire organizations in Cyprus and the Jewish underground.

The National Organization of Cypriot Fighters (EOKA) was an unusual case of a post-World War II nationalist and ethnic Greek group that used terrorism and repudiated Marxism-Leninism. Remarkably independent, it lacked the kind of heavy external support and sanctuary to which some always ascribe insurgent success. The EOKA was founded in 1951 by George Grivas; he arrived on the island three years later; April 1955 saw the opening of guerrilla war; the violence combined with negotiations

to force British troops to abandon Cyprus; independence came in 1960. This was, however, but a partial success. Grivas and his sophisticated organization were of the 80 percent on the island whose blood was Greek, not Turkish, and the revolutionaries dreamed of full unity with Greece, not a separate state. A decade later, phase two of the struggle opened under the command of EOKA-B. Now the underground cells attacked indigenous Cypriots, took hostages, and raided armories in a renewed campaign to seize the whole island for unification with the mainland. George Grivas died of heart failure in 1974; attrition and jailing took further tolls on his organization. A December 1977 kidnapping of the Cypriot president's son in a plot to free colleagues from prison failed. The group announced dissolution in the next year.⁵² Their legacy is thus mixed: a two-part campaign separated by a decade of peace left partial success—the expulsion of the British army and government but not a unification with Greece.

Several Jewish organizations fighting inside the British Mandate may also lay claim to a degree of success after mid-length campaigns. The achievement of an entirely new and free democratic state of Israel in 1948 appears to some people to justify the actions of Irgun Zvai Leumi, Lohame Herut Israel, and others. In fact, their terrorism is no more redeemable than that of African National Congress/Spear of the Nation bombers, burners, and assassins whose efforts contributed to destroying apartheid in South Africa. The model for Jewish liberation fighters is no terrorist organization but instead the Haganah, the mass organization that consistently and successfully resisted Arab, British, and Nazi rulers and deployed guerrilla attacks against their military assets. They were the militant Jews who most succeeded with war, but two further groups—both terrorist—helped destroy British authority over Palestine. The Irgun Zvai Leumi (IZL, or Etzel) was founded by David Raziel in 1937 and was led after his death in 1941 by Menachem Begin. The IZL used terror against the Arab population as well as British targets. The latter included the King David Hotel (1946), which had both civil and military administrative functions; that attack killed 91 people and was later detailed in Begin's autobiography *The Revolt*.⁵³ A fanatical group broke away from the IZL in 1940, damning its truce with the British during years of war with the German Reich; Abraham Stern's gang was formally known as Lohame Herut Israel (LHI, or Lehi, or Lechi).⁵⁴ Their attacks on Jewish rivals mirror the inter-ethnic slaughters of a hundred of the twentieth century's terror groups. The Stern Gang leadership moved to David Yassin in 1942, and the group continued

killing: Jews; the British, including Lord Moyne;⁵⁵ and, most revealingly, Sweden's Count Bernadotte, whose very purpose was to negotiate peace in Palestine. Here, too, was a revealing terrorist pattern: the explicit war upon peacemakers.⁵⁶

Several other terrorist groups might claim limited success after a campaign of eight to 15 years' length. A marginal case is the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA), which left many more bloody spots around Western Europe, hitting hard as late as 1986. Its leader perished two years later. Soon thereafter the Republic of Armenia came into being. This was primarily due to the disappearance of Soviet power, but it dramatically undercut the perceived need for terrorism and brought relief to militant nationalists who had earlier waved the flag and the gun.

Successful. The final parties to tier II are the more successful terrorists, whose mid-length campaigns brought them to power. The century's first success, the Bolsheviks, achieved the near-impossible between 1905 and 1917, taking total power and immediately using it to terrorize and destroy their innumerable enemies on the left and the right. History's next example might be the more moderate National Liberation Front (FLN) of Algeria. Fatigued with years of squabbling between militants and reformers, the FLN sprang to life in late 1954, published a short, powerful declaration to which they adhered closely, and took power in Algiers in 1962. These politicians, diplomats, guerrillas, and terrorists set the revolutionary standard for the post-World War II era. For example, their clever and violent methods of crushing Algerians opposed to them as "the sole legitimate voice" of nationalism would be aped by Palestinian militants under Yasser Arafat's leadership. They also exported the revolution to the Algerians in France, extracting funding, killing opponents, and undermining French desires to hold the Central Maghreb. The FLN shows how terrorism may end in success.

Central America offers the case the Nicaraguan Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN). While many neighboring revolutionaries failed or slipped into dormancy (e.g., Guatemala, Honduras, or Mexico), the Sandinistas won and won completely. Founded by 1961,⁵⁷ at a time when the Cuban and Algerian FLN examples were heated inspirations, the Sandinistas were revolutionary but enjoyed broad popularity among frustrated farmers and other reformers. Soviet bloc provisioning and Cuban direction were of great help in shaping the group. Their main period of

violence is of midterm duration: 1963 to 1979. They slowly discredited the Somoza dictatorship and rattled the regime with terror attacks and strikes on the National Guard. Not long after the United States nervously withdrew support to the sitting government, the Sandinistas marched into Managua (July 1979). The regime lasted 11 years; then the Sandinistas dared to risk elections and lost. But the turning screw of history kept on, and after years in the wilderness, they returned to power, winning elections in November 2006. Daniel Ortega is president again.

Asian insurgencies on the Maoist model also demand attention, especially the Khmer Rouge and Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist), or CPN(M). The former hacked its way into the capital in 1975 and ruled until expelled in late 1978 by the stronger army of Vietnam. Comrade Prachanda's Nepalese Maoists also began slowly and with protracted war, taking over swaths of countryside by combining overt politics, clandestine organization, terrorism, and guerrilla war. Then, as Nepal's monarchy tilted in impotence and reformists began calling out in Katmandu, the CPN(M) cut a remarkable political deal that put Prachanda into the prime minister's chair in 2006. His promises to demobilize his thugs have only been partially kept, which means that if overt politicking ceases to meet the party's needs, other options remain. No one need hurry in a protracted war.

Thus, a midterm lifespan does not signal defeat, necessarily. Religio-nationalist groups in this category have flourished and survived for many years and eked out demonstrable gains. Several secular leftist and revolutionary organizations using terrorism have similarly enjoyed limited success. Their will to survive and their gains over time indicate the truth in an old maxim about guerrilla war: that in some ways, merely to carry on fighting is to succeed.

III. Groups with Longevity

Defeated. The third and final tier is organizations with great longevity—protracted campaigns by terrorist groups. Some were ultimately and thoroughly beaten. The international anarchists, dramatic actors of the last two decades of the nineteenth century, all but ceased affecting the political world after 1920. Later an ideological opposite emerged with similar fate: the effort of Chin Peng and others of the Malayan Races Liberation Army to create a communist state ended formally with his surrender, after decades, in 1989.

One might reasonably take the long view of a “war”—rather than study a given group’s shorter “campaign”—when examining nationalist militants in Ireland or in Puerto Rico. Puerto Rican nationalist attacks in the early 1950s, the latter 1970s, and the early 1980s all melted away, as tactical successes had no real strategic results. Successively, the Puerto Rican Nationalist Party, the FALN, and then Los Macheteros have won no important political change. The commonwealth remains a commonwealth; polling data still show revolution or total independence to be a far-fetched idea; new recruiting is minuscule; no foreign powers have stepped in to aid the militants other than Cuba—now largely inactive in this respect.

The Tamil Tigers of the LTTE lack roots so long, but they did begin as early as 1972.⁵⁸ They survived innumerable government campaigns and were only smashed in their “liberated zones” in early 2009. Another communist group of very different and urban character enjoyed almost as long a lifespan but was decidedly less lethal. The Revolutionary Organization 17 November was made up of a handful of Greek Marxist-Leninists who operated in Athens for a quarter century. They attacked Greeks, Americans, and NATO personnel—sometimes using the same Colt pistol—and also targeted multinational corporations. They managed to do so year after year, never even suffering a single arrest. But the small size which made this evasion possible⁵⁹ also flagged N17’s unpopularity and failure to recruit. Lack of numbers likewise determined that if all operations might be secure from police, there would be very few operations. As the 2004 Athens Olympics approached, Greeks in government took a new attitude toward terrorists. A break for security forces came when an N17 man failed in a bombing, wounded himself, and then talked. Immediately, most of the small organization was arrested, and trials led to long sentences. N17 has come and gone.⁶⁰

There are certain examples of fighting groups that devoted decades to their will to power and yet failed entirely. Those studied here are mostly internationalists of one sort or another, including anarchists and leftists. Two communist insurgent groups also manifest strong quotients of nationalism in their work. If one examined state terrorism sponsors, Libya’s three-decade record would fit here—as a failure.⁶¹ It is more common, however, for a well-organized fighting group to achieve more over time, to create “liberated zones,” or otherwise make permanent effects, which brings us to the next rubric.

Limited Success. Terrorist groups of protracted duration that have achieved limited gains are many and richly varied. We may study the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) as a discrete entity, a guerrilla and terrorist organization with an intimate party affiliate. It began in a 1969 split with other nationalists and ended its violence against unsuspecting civilians with the 1998 Good Friday Accord. That Irish Republican Army (IRA), so delimited, is a clear case of limited success. Militancy had of course cropped up often before the twentieth century, as when Napoleonic France aided Wolf Tone and a few decades later when Americans began shipping weapons and money to insurrectionists in Ireland.⁶² A periodically successful Irish fight began in 1916 and manifested guerrilla and/or terrorist variants. The IRA had some sleepy years in the twentieth century but came to life as the “Provos” in 1969 and 1970, fired with passion over civil rights as well as nationalism and a dash of Marxist-Leninism. A few British overreactions, and indeed the 1972 “Bloody Sunday” event, encouraged the hard men and drew in recruits. By the 1990s, many felt a kind of stasis; the Provos could neither win nor be beaten. Their leaders bent more to politics and sought to do less with terrorism. They negotiated with London, won limited concessions, and joined governance circles in the Stormont-based parliament in Ulster. There is no unification of Northern Ireland with the Eire republic, and the IRA Provos submitted to disarmament—or partially so. On the other hand, the Provos have seen comrades released from jails by the score; they operate openly, peaceably, and respectably; they have not surrendered their many foreign friends; and they can return to terrorism if they so decide. This could occur as a group effort, in theory, or more likely, scattered individuals may choose to join extant splinter groups such as the Real IRA.

The irony in this is that the Orangemen, too, can claim partial success from terrorist campaigns. And perhaps they should. The Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF), which declared war on the IRA in 1966, and the Ulster Freedom Fighters (UFF), begun in 1973, are as able as the PIRA/Provos’ Gerry Adams and Martin McGuinness to see a “partial victory” in the status quo of the last decade. They fought below and above ground for decades, hurting as many Irish as English, and securing prestige and precious political space in that tormented island. Unlike smaller killing squads (e.g., the Red Hand Defenders), the UVF and UFF also work with political fronts, making them more significant and more morally credible. Now these major Loyalist groups have put down guns and taken up balloting; all their sup-

porters, in English and Irish politics, may see the former terrorists sharing banal administrative duties and profound political responsibilities in a new parliamentary structure in the Stormont parliamentary building just outside Belfast. The Orangemen of illegal bands are “preservationist”⁶³ terrorists who have arguably helped keep the six counties under the British Crown; at least, few would dare tell them otherwise.

Twentieth-century history is crowded with candidates for this rubric of protracted campaigns leading to limited success. American labor militants—a few of whom were terrorists—gradually won major concessions, first in wages and then organizational rights and later in benefits, and came to struggle pacifically and successfully in recent decades. The traditionalist and racist American Ku Klux Klans have atrophied drastically. Once a mass movement, now but numerous cells; they have never disappeared in 150 years of influence. In Colombia, the FARC and ELN are examples of rural insurgencies, widely using terror, that seem ineradicable and have endured for half a century. That mark may one day be met by India’s Naxalites—Maoists who are, in effect, a shadow government in certain areas. Western Europe’s ETA Basques have lasted exactly a half century. France remains bedeviled by the Corsican National Liberation Front, which still lights up strings of bombs to keep alive hopes of withdrawal from France and its system of district governance—as Algeria succeeded in doing in the insurgency ending in 1962. France is also troubled as the European home to the secular and ideologically vague People’s Mujahedeen of Iran (PMOI), also known as the People’s Mujahedeen al Khalq (MEK), which is still under veteran leaders’ wings. Contained and disarmed on Iraqi territory and subject to US and Iraqi controls through 2008, the MEK still flourishes politically abroad. While this is especially true in France, the MEK also enjoys friends in the halls of US and European national parliaments.

Certain Middle Eastern groups are marginal but unrepressed; these include the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine—General Command, a Syrian-supported terror outfit that has operated for decades with no one to control it but Israeli forces. Hezbollah has turned covert and overt organization and violence into de facto political control over large swaths of Lebanon.⁶⁴ Its success in national politics in Lebanon has been immense, as indicated by its presence in political bodies and the national political life. The “mainstreaming” of such terrorists is a reproof to thinking that terrorism “has always failed and . . . will fail again,” as one post-9/11 argument proclaimed. Much more narrowly, a think tank report of

2008 about the fate of terrorists concludes that “Religious groups rarely achieve their objectives.”⁶⁵ Even that more careful view is misleading—given the impressive if incomplete successes of such religious-based groups as Hezbollah and HAMAS.

Analysts may find innumerable cases in the range of moderately successful groups engaged in protracted struggle and terrorism. From the radical rightist and preservationist terror groups, one may look to the left, and nationalist-leftist, and onward to religiously motivated politicos. The most successful have strategies that far exceed terrorist methods, combining these in a prudent and broad approach to power. Some may ultimately fail, but others appear likely to move to greater plateaus of success.

Successful. Earlier pages and rubrics explored terrorist successes—for example, the Bolsheviks, the Algerian FLN, Greek-Cypriot EOKA, some Jewish groups, and the Sandinistas—that achieved some or all of their strategic objectives after violent campaigns of medium duration. But there are also a few groups of longer life that did come to triumph and take state power.

In South Africa, 1961 saw the creation of The Spear of the Nation, forged to do bloody work for the African National Congress (founded 1912). This mid-century strategic choice followed years of indifferent political success; ANC militants now bombed energy companies, shopping centers, and other civilian targets. Later they commenced “necklacings”—victims were bound, seated, and then burned by means of placing an automobile tire around the torso, filling it with gasoline, and torching it. This was apparently done to murder black rivals or dissidents more often than white South Africans, an example of an old pattern—terrorism for discipline and control of “one’s own.” In retrospect, ANC terrorism led towards stunning electoral triumphs—not unlike the ways Palestinian terrorism has done so.

Yasser Arafat’s Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) was created in 1964. Like most revolutionaries, it aspired to match the fresh triumph of the FLN in Algeria. Fatah was the armed force created and shaped by the PLO; after it, innumerable subgroups and splinters appeared which achieved a certain advantage in deniability and deception. Except for Abu Nidal’s gang,⁶⁶ which left the PLO only to hunt its former colleagues, the PLO splinter groups were generally helpful and useful to Arafat. He might support an Abu Abbas (of the PLO) in one season, then hold him at arm’s length later, and welcome him back in a new springtime. Skillful as an organizer, adequate as an orator, immovable as the controller of PLO businesses

and income streams, Arafat won. It took three decades of his own blend of protracted war, yet he created a Palestinian homeland. It may today be divided in civil war, but it is a statelet; Israel has departed and hopes to avoid unpleasant returns; foreign governments jostle one another to lead in supplying humanitarian aid to Palestinians under the control of the Palestine Authority (PA); HAMAS terrorist acts all rebound in favor of PA legitimacy and give the older, more secular guard airs of empathy. Thus, the PLO and Fatah and the ANC’s Spear of the Nation are among the few cases in which long-term efforts, including systematic terrorism, have led eventually to strategic success.

An Afterword: Wither al-Qaeda?

Al-Qaeda falls within our rubric of real longevity and limited success (III B). This innovative, international, and powerful organization has taken body-blows without going down. It lost in Afghanistan and still found cover. It absorbed members of Egypt’s battered al-Jihad group at the end of the 1990s; in early 2007 it absorbed North Africans of the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat; European converts and others have joined to offset losses. Many senior and mid-level leaders have been killed or captured, yet several of the newest leaders are from the ranks stupidly released from Guantanamo and other prisons.⁶⁷

Certainly al-Qaeda and its allies will never achieve their “New Caliphate,” but what matters is that they are fighting for it. No one should claim they have “failed” when top leaders with long experience and obvious charisma remain in the field (Osama bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri, and Taliban partner Mullah Omar). Al-Qaeda’s terrorism has made impressions on the politics, public opinion, or defense policies of a hundred countries worldwide, as in the US troop withdrawal from Saudi Arabia, bin Laden’s birthplace. It accomplishes such things; holds up its intellectual, moral, political, and religious banners of attack; and protects many of its human and financial assets in the face of the largest manhunt in global history. To call al-Qaeda a “failure” would be the most desperate form of false hopes. It is apparent that states, and the international community, have much to do before al-Qaeda ends.

Editor's Epilogue

Terrorist groups in many forms have been around for many years and will be around for even more. Success or failure depends on a myriad of factors, both internally and externally controlled. Government intervention in the early stages of terrorist formation is most effective by employing a sophisticated grand strategy, solid political leadership, fine intelligence, effective civilian law enforcement, and a well-trained and disciplined military. As a terrorist group ages, different approaches may need to be initiated. For example, seduction of the terrorists' bases and co-opting membership becomes more important. Denying recruitment of new members and support from external sources is paramount. Once a terrorist organization becomes decades old, it may in fact resort to negotiations or even risk election and mainstream political action. Faced with these myriad scenarios, the challenge for modern-day strategists is to analyze the stage of the terrorist group and consider the most effective course of defeat. **SSQ**

EXTENT OF TERRORIST SUCCESS: DEFEATED		DURATION of MAIN VIOLENCE: MIDTERM		DURATION of MAIN VIOLENCE: PROTRACTED, DECADES	
DURATION of MAIN VIOLENCE: SHORT 5 YRS OR LESS	DURATION of MAIN VIOLENCE: 8-15 YEARS	DURATION of MAIN VIOLENCE: MIDTERM	DURATION of MAIN VIOLENCE: PROTRACTED, DECADES	DURATION of MAIN VIOLENCE: PROTRACTED, DECADES	DURATION of MAIN VIOLENCE: PROTRACTED, DECADES
OAS (Org. of Secret Army) 1960-1962, No. Africa & W. Eur.	61-62	Huks (Huksalahan) 1946-1955, Luzon, Philippines Tupamaros 1962-1976, Uruguay.	48-54 63-75	International Anarchists (lethal) 1866-1920s, Northern Hemisphere	1880-1920
ELN (National Lib. Army) 1966-1967, Bolivia (Che)	67	JVP (Janatha Vimukthi Peruna) (People's Lib. Front) 1967-1989, Sri Lanka RAF (Red Army Faction) 1968-1992, Germany	67-75 68-77	Malayan Races Liberation Army 1946-1988, Malaysia & Thai border & Chin Peng 70-77	46-60
ALN (National Liberating Action) 1968-1970, São Paulo, Brazil (Marighella)	68-70	The Weathermen 1969-1980, USA Red Brigades 1970-1983, Italy	74-81	JRA (Japanese Red Army) 1969-2001, Japan and Middle East	70-88
SLA (Symbionese Liberation Army) 1972-1975, California	73-75	Montoneros 1970-1984, Argentina	70-77	LTTE (Lib. Tigers of Tamil Eelam) 1972-2009, Sri Lanka	74-90
Front Line (Primea Linea) 1976-1982, Italy	76-81	M-19 (19th of April Movement) 1970-1989, Colombia	74-86	ANO (Abu Nidal Org. or Black June) 1974-2002, Middle East and world	74-94
VZJ (Free South Malaccan Youth Org.) 1975-1979, Netherlands	75-78	2nd of June Movement 1971-1980, Germany	71-78	Revolutionary Organization 17 November 1975-2003, Greece	75-02
Hoffman Military Sports Group 1979-1981, Germany	80-81	Shining Path 1971-Peru	80-92		
The Order 1982-1984, Pacific N.W., USA	83-84	Aryan Nations 1974-2001, USA	84-99		
Communist Combatant Cells 1984-1985, Belgium	84-85	FALN (Armed Forces of National Lib.) 1974-1985, Puerto Rico, US	75-83		
		MRTA (Tupac Amaru) 1975-1997, Peru	78-96		
		Los Macheteiros (Machete Wielders) 1978-1986/88, Puerto Rico & USA	78-86		
		Action Direct 1979-1987, France	79-87		
		Popular Forces of 25 April 1980-1992, Portugal	80-86		
		FMLN 1980-El Salvador	80-90		
		The Order 1982-1985, USA .	83-84		
		Aum Shinrikyo 1984-1995, Japan & Russia	88-95		

EXTENT OF TERRORIST SUCCESS: LIMITED GAINS

DURATION of MAIN VIOLENCE: SHORT 5 YRS OR LESS	DURATION of MAIN VIOLENCE: MIDTERM 8-15 YEARS	DURATION of MAIN VIOLENCE: PROTRACTED, DECADES
Black Panthers 1966-1972, USA	67-72	Irgun (Irgun Zvai Leumi) Lehi (Lohame Herut Israel/Stern Gang) Israel
AUC (United Self-Def. Forces of Col.) 1997-2005, Colombia	97-02	EOKA (National Org. of Cypriot Fighters) 1951-1960, Cyprus FLQ (Quebecois Liberation Front) 1963-1972, Canada ASALA (Secret Army for Lib. Armenia) 1975-1983, Lebanon & Europe HAMAS (Islamic Resistance Movement) 1987-Palestinian Territories & Israel Taliban 1994-Pakistan & Afghanistan
		37-48 40-48 54-59 66-70 75-86 88- 94-01
		KKK (Ku Klux Klan) USA (& Canada early 20th cent.) UVF (Ulster Volunteer Force) 1912- Northern Ireland ETA (Basque Homeland & Liberty) 1959- Spain (& French borderland) ELN (National Lib. Army) 1964-Colombia FARC (Rev. Armed Forces of Col.) 1966-Colombia IRA Provisionals 1916-69-UK and the Continent NPA (New People's Army) 1969-Philippines MEK / PMOI (People's Muj. Al Khalq) Iranians in exile PFLP-GC (Pop. Front for Lib. of Palestine) General Command 1967- Middle East & W. Europe Naxalites (Comm. Party of India/Maoist) 1969-India UFF (Ulster Freedom Fighters) 1973-Northern Ireland FLNC (Corsican National Lib. Front) 1976-Corsica & mainland France Hezbollah (The Party of God) 1983-Lebanon al Qaeda 1988-SW Asia & the world
		1866- 66-early 70s 62- 81-98 66- 70-98 69- 71-1966/67- 68-88 75- 73- 73- 82/83- 98-

EXTENT OF TERRORIST SUCCESS: STRATEGIC SUCCESS			
DURATION of MAIN VIOLENCE: SHORT 5 YRS OR LESS	DURATION of MAIN VIOLENCE: MIDTERM 8-15 YEARS	DURATION of MAIN VIOLENCE: MIDTERM PROTRACTED, DECADES	DURATION of MAIN VIOLENCE: PROTRACTED, DECADES
None—with possible exception of M-26-7 (26th of July Movement) Cuba, 1952/55–1959	58–59 Bolsheviks 1903–1917, Russia FLN (National Lib. Front) 1954– Algeria, No. Africa, & France Khmer Rouge 1951/61–1978, Cambodia Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) 1990s–	05–17 54–62 62–78 96–05	ANC (African National Congress, Spear of the Nation, etc.) 1912/1961– FSLN (Sandinistas) 1961–Nicaragua PLO: Fatah, Black Sept., etc. 1964–Palestinian Territories 61–88

Notes

1. Scholars must recognize certain intellectual debts, and good scholars enjoy doing so. My debts are happily paid in this and earlier places, especially to Martha Crenshaw. One begins with her essay “How Terrorism Declines,” in *Terrorism and Political Violence* 3, no. 1 (Spring 1991): 69–87, and its admirable chart. There was a distinctive direction to my body of earlier work on this subject (e.g., many public presentations in 2004, a speech on Capitol Hill, a Webcast from the Woodrow Wilson Center in Washington, DC, on 20 March 2006, a book chapter with Cambridge University Press earlier that year, etc.). It was to retrace researches I’d made over a previous quarter century, present a half dozen leading reasons for terrorist group decline, and then detail examples within each rubric. The present essay’s approach is new, guided more by chronology, and my analysis profits from continued study of individual-named terror groups. Endnotes for chap. 7 of my book *Terrorism Today*, 2nd ed. (London & New York: Routledge, 2007) indicate other resources I found worthy.

2. Joseph T. McCann, *Terrorism on American Soil: A Concise History of Plots and Perpetrators from the Famous to the Forgotten* (Boulder, CO: Sentient Publications, 2006), 33–40.

3. Labor histories by L. Adamic and G. W. Meaker are cited in Walter Laqueur, *The Age of Terrorism*, 2d ed. (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1987), 75.

4. Barbara Tuchman, *The Proud Tower: A Portrait of the World before the War, 1890–1914* (New York: Scribner/Macmillan, 1966).

5. There are two good English-language accounts (known to me) of the precipitous fall of N17. A gifted student at the Institute of World Politics in Washington, DC, aviation security expert Mr. Paris Michaels, wrote an unpublished 2003 paper for our course. George Kassimeris of the University of Wolverhampton, England, published a detailed article, “Last Act in a Violent Drama? The Trial of Greece’s Revolutionary Organization 17 November,” *Terrorism and Political Violence* 18, no. 1 (March 2006): 137–57. The group’s head of operations is quoted saying the group was finished as a terrorist organization yet could return in some other form, “perhaps, in 10–15 years’ time, a new generation of fighters for the people might relaunch the struggle” (p. 153). It may be relevant that several Greek cities faced protracted rioting in late 2008 following a police shooting, and that since 2003 a terrorist group called Revolutionary Struggle has emerged.

6. I have often spoken in lectures of the roles of Horst Herold and German police in the attrition of the RAF cadre. Introducing “computer profiling” and diligence with detail allowed federal authorities to find, one by one, the RAF militants. As there were never more than a few dozen weapons-carrying members; arrests reduced the group to nothing. In recent years, nearly all members have been released from jail. The unrepentant Hans Christian Klar, guilty of 20 murders or attempted murders, won early release in late 2008, prompting debate in Germany and this comment by Bavarian justice minister Joachim Hermann: “Klar deserves no sympathy as long as he continues to show none for his victims.” *Christian Science Monitor*, 22 December 2008; and *BBC News*, 19 December 2008.

7. This appellation, often self-applied by the terrorists, was taken up by two scholars as a subtitle for their fine book, *Europe’s Red Terrorists: The Fighting Communist Organizations*, by Yonah Alexander and Dennis Pluchinsky (London: Frank Cass, 1992). They include several post-1990 RAF documents, such as the aforementioned confession of failure dated 15 April 1992. In 1998 came yet another confession of failure from an RAF hand, so that year, too, appears in print sometimes as “the end of the Baader-Meinhof organization.”

8. One careful listing of relevant regional and subregional offices and organizations is by Florina Cristiana (Cris) Matei, “Combating Terrorism and Organized Crime: South Eastern

Europe Collective Approaches,” in *Bilten Slovenske Vojske*, the journal of the Slovenian Armed Forces (September 2008), 37–58.

9. Teaching case studies of counterinsurgency success long ago convinced me that defections are a superior metric for decline. When Colombia’s vice-minister of defense Sergio Jaramillo wrote “Pourquoi le Temps Joue Contre les FARC” for *Le Figaro*, 23 January 2008, he reported that 1,454 FARC members had quit in 2007, double of the previous year. As this occurred in the context of much-enhanced skills and professionalism by the Colombian armed forces, I took it to be highly significant. A few months later, the Ingrid Betancourt hostage party was rescued in a Colombian special forces operation—another case in which years of negotiations failed but surgical force worked brilliantly.

10. *The Turner Diaries*, a 1978 novel by William L. Pierce (writing under the pseudonym Andrew MacDonald), is linked to at least five killings or nonlethal terrorist incidents of 1995–2006; see the 2d edition of my book *Terrorism Today*, 18–19. Other incidents in the present text are documented by Department of Justice/FBI publication *Terrorism in the United States: 1999–30 years of Terrorism, A Special Retrospective Edition* (Montgomery, AL: Southern Poverty Law Center Publications, 2001) and by media reports.

11. This answer reveals the difference between “pro-state” terrorism and right-wing terrorism. The former is exercised by agents or partisans of state power, but in the US case it was precisely federal power that was most active against the racists. Right-wing terrorism of the KKK sort was by substate actors who hated the federal government’s intervention in southern American affairs.

12. This also happened in Cologne, Germany. In September 2008, a few dozen rightists appeared to rally against “Islamisation and immigration invasion.” Forty thousand counterprotesters swamped the scene, and the initial marchers literally fled. See Jess Smee, “‘Anti-Islamisation’ Event Abandoned after Protests,” *Irish Times*, 20 September 2008, <http://www.irishtimes.com/newspaper/world/2008/0920/1221835126595.html>.

13. Europol, *EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report, March 2007*, www.europol.europa.eu.

14. When freed from jail in the mid 1980s, Tupamaros leader Raul Sendic refounded his movement as a legitimate political party—the Movement of Popular Participation—and that, too, is part of how some terror groups end. On such groups as the Tupamaros, the best single source is Michael Radu and Vladimir Tismaneanu, *Latin American Revolutionaries: Groups, Goals, Methods* (Washington: Pergamon-Brassey’s, 1990).

15. One thorough English account of the chronicles of torture in Argentina is Paul H. Lewis, *Guerrillas and Generals: The “Dirty War” in Argentina* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2002), e.g., 150–59. The book was given to me by a gifted and humane military officer of that country who wished that others avoid his country’s mistakes while waging the “global war on terror.”

16. Paul Hockenos, *Joschka Fisher and the Making of the Berlin Republic* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).

17. Claire Sterling, *The Terror Network: The Secret War of International Terrorism* (New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1981), chap. 2.

18. The impressive and deliberative way Italian democracy brought an end to terrorism has been remarkably understudied despite bales of publications on that country’s violence. A recent exception is the well-done Leonard Weinberg chapter, “The Red Brigades.” It does note that the antiterrorist police DIGOS probably used torture in a very few cases during the attempt to find kidnapped NATO general James Dozier and in its aftermath. *Democracy and Counterterrorism: Lessons from the Past*, eds. Robert Art and Louise Richardson (Washington: US Institute of Peace Press, 2007), 49–56, are relevant.

19. No Italian leftist killings of the 1980s (after 1981) make the 31-page chronicle of international terror incidents 1920–2007 by Ann E. Robertson, *Terrorism and Global Security* (New

York: Facts on File, 2007). My main source is the detailed research in Donnatella della Porta, "Left Wing Terrorism in Italy," in *Terrorism in Context*, ed. Martha Crenshaw (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995). Certainly there have been leftist terrorist actions in Italy in the last 10 years; two murders in 2002 and 2003 were claimed by a group calling itself "Red Brigades," prompting newspaper reports of a revival.

20. I have yet to study Pierre Vallières' introduction to the movement, *Qu'est-ce que le FLQ?* but read with profit his 1967/1968 aggressively titled prison memoir *White N----- of America: The Precocious Autobiography of a Quebec "Terrorist"* (New York: Monthly Review, 1968).

21. One contribution to this Canadian case is Ted Robert Gurr, "Terrorism in Democracies," chap. 6, in *Origins of Terrorism*, a superb book edited by Walter Reich (Washington: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1998).

22. It is not surprising that Filiberto Ojeda Rios declined to "walk away" from terrorism when discovered in September 2005 or that the FBI had to use its weapons. In a previous arrest, this same terrorist had begun burning documents when agents knocked at his door; he then opened fire with a machine gun, blinding an FBI agent in the eye. Ojeda Rios was disarmed. Later he jumped bail.

23. If some four million live on the island of Puerto Rico, more than two million more now live in the rest of the United States—which helps explain the disparate locations of these terrorist attacks.

24. See "Timeline: ETA Attacks," *BBC News*, last updated 6 August 2009, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/545452.stm>.

25. "Paris and Madrid United against Terrorism," *Le Figaro*, 11 January 2008 (trans. CCH).

26. American writers, even in military journals, sometimes misrepresent Mao's concepts. From his writings of the 1920s and 1930s and the historical work of Samuel Griffith, I see "phase one" warfare as the strategic defensive—characterized by political organization and guerrilla war (as well as terrorism, which Mao usually declines to mention). "Phase two" warfare is a strategic equilibrium in which the insurgency is strong enough to hold its ground, and in which guerrilla war continues, supplemented by positional and even conventional war elements. In "phase three," the insurgency has developed well politically and is battle-tested militarily, and commanders can use all manners of fighting that are appropriate, especially conventional positional war. Mao's theory is too often treated skeptically, even by scholars; it well accounts for the progress and successful resolution of wars in China (1949) and Vietnam (1975). The FARC and LTTE are thus groups that for many years have been locked into "phase two" war with their respective enemies. For an effective use of Mao's theory to illuminate modern Islamist fighting, see Dr. Norman Cigar's introduction to Abd al-Aziz al-Muqrin, *A Practical Course for Guerrilla War: Al Qaida's Doctrine for Insurgency* (Dulles, VA: Potomac Books, 2008).

27. One Sikh group took down an Air Canada flight, killing 329 passengers, in June 1985. Perhaps a scholar interested in how terror groups end, a regional expert such as K. P. S. Gill, will one day detail how it was that international Sikh terror had so short a lifespan.

28. Ami Pedahzur, William Eubank, and Leonard Weinberg, "The War on Terrorism and the Decline of Terrorist Group Formation: A Research Note," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 14, no. 3 (Autumn 2002): 141–47.

29. Of the several English-language books on Aum, the best may be Ian Reader, *Religious Violence in Contemporary Japan: The Case of Aum Shinrikyo* (Richmond, UK: Curzon, 2000), e.g., 193–95.

30. Haruki Murakami, trans. A. Birnbaum and P. Gabriel, *Underground: The Tokyo Gas Attack and the Japanese Psyche* (New York: Vintage Books, 2001).

31. David E. Kaplan and Andrew Marshall, *The Cult at the End of the World: The Terrifying Story of the Aum Doomsday Cult, from the Subways of Tokyo to the Nuclear Arsenals of Russia* (New York: Crown Publishers, 1996), 108–12.

32. Lt Col John Kane, USMC, has been of good help in tracking the cyber side of Aum and of Aleph.

33. While events in 2008 seemed to instruct the national government in the dangers Hezbollah poses inside Lebanon, it has been striking to hear how apologetic many previous official statements have been. Twice I heard radio interviews in which the Lebanese ambassador to the United States said nothing but good about Hezbollah and blamed the group's violence on the "Israeli occupation"—which, with the exception of a couple of farms, had ended *years before*. Government spokesmen were ignoring as well the policy ends of Hezbollah, which are contrary to those of democratic, multiconfessional Lebanon, and the meddling of Iran, which Hezbollah itself counts as its mentor.

34. According to A. N. Pratt, posted to a Middle East diplomatic mission during early 2008, Iran gives HAMAS some \$120 million a year. Other estimates of Iranian aid to Hezbollah have been as high.

35. See Department of State, *Country Reports on Terrorism—2007* (Washington: Government Printing Office, April 2008), and past versions of this State Department annual, which has appeared for three decades. In certain recent years the report suffered from flaws in its statistics, which required correction in some cases, but I do not accept the implications suggested by resultant newspaper articles. I find the report in general an admirable compilation and a sound record of most events, highly useful to scholars, and less flawed than the terrorism coverage of many books and periodicals.

36. "The Covenant of the Islamic Resistance Movement," offered up to the "Name of the Most Merciful Allah," is dated 18 August 1988 and may be found on the website of the Avalon Project at Yale Law School, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/subject_menus/mideast.asp.

37. When speaking of a group's lifespan, I refer to its participation in violence of consequence to the state; therefore, some periods of several years or even a decade (e.g., Sendero in the 1970s) spent in preparation and planning may be excluded. So, too, might one exclude years of quiet after violence (as when members of the Symbionese Liberation Army, having failed, hid underground, 1976–1999). My chart shows dates for the group's existence, but others for the years of "main violence." Consistent with the PTSS approach, I include discussion of appropriate *insurgent* groups that systematically employ terror; this article is not merely focused on small terrorist cells.

38. Peter Janke, *Guerrilla and Terrorist Organizations: A World Directory and Bibliography* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1983), 23. The Hoffman group is so lost to history that even the US National Counterterrorism Center's annual desk diaries say nothing of the bombing on 26 September 1980. Yet, its significance recurred in 2009 when the famous fall festival in Munich was again directly threatened by terrorists—of al-Qaeda.

39. Radu and Tismaneanu, *Latin American Revolutionaries*, 115–23.

40. Ibid.; and Janke, *Guerrilla and Terrorist Organizations*, 431–40.

41. Yonah Alexander and Dennis Pluchinsky, *Europe's Red Terrorists: The Fighting Communist Organizations* (London: Frank Cass, 1992), 148–50. Marine Corps University was honored to have both these scholars in its colloquium on "Terrorist Group Vulnerabilities" in Quantico, VA, 30 April 2007.

42. Are the Black Panthers a case of limited success? They emerged in 1966 and 1967 with aspirations to be a sort of armed wing of the civil rights movement. They expected status as a virtuous self-defense force and carried weapons openly amidst claims to protect their communities and their race from the diffidence of a white majority and the aggressions of its white

government. Their quotidian work included “survival activities” such as providing food and medical aid and schools in impoverished areas. Their other side was to be found in brutalizing critics, open calls to “Kill the Pigs” (police), and physical attacks on the establishment. The Panthers found themselves very much out-gunned by police; many died at police hands, and their supporters often claimed assassination. More (including “defense minister” Huey Newton) died committing crimes or in battles with other black militants. Dozens were arrested and jailed for rape, drug-dealing, assault, and other crimes, illustrating the criminality often typical of a political terror group. A few Panther notables fled abroad, to return years later, usually disillusioned by life in Cuba or Algeria. Their organized political violence lasted but a half decade, ending in 1971/1972. Some Panthers spent the next years folding peaceably into American political and social life, winning community and city elections, or devoting themselves to education. Some wrote memoirs. They had not fallen into indiscriminate killing of normal citizens; this set them apart and helped make them a limited success in America. Panthers would doubtless claim to have helped the civil rights movement by using publicity, psychological shock, and the spectacle of openly bearing arms; they would say they advanced with force while other black activists advanced related causes in more pacific, less controversial ways. There are many published memoirs on these times—some by Panthers themselves—as well as Peter Collier and David Horowitz, *Destructive Generation: Second Thoughts about the '60s* (New York: Summit Books, 1990), 149 ff; and Crenshaw, “How Terrorism Declines,” 81.

43. Dr. David Tucker is one of the very few American authors in recent years to document and discuss Castroite terrorism during the rise to power, which ended in 1959—something older reports and US congressional hearings used to cover. Tucker details several incidents of hostage taking and so forth in a book drawing well on both his DoD and academic work, *Skirmishes at the Edge of Empire: The United States and International Terrorism* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1997). My point that guerrilla war was far more important than terrorism is also why this essay does not attempt to include so massive a movement as the Chinese Communist Party’s rise to state power in 1949.

44. One notable Huk attack devastated a military hospital and featured widespread murder of patients. That is a tactic even the most nihilistic terrorist groups avoid—although certain Chechens savaged a hospital.

45. By contrast, Malaysian communists were pushed out without surrendering. Chin Peng and some remnants held out for decades in Thai border areas, quitting only with a treaty signed 2 December 1989.

46. The Tupamaros became fashionable; their kidnapping and political theater tactics excited widespread admiration on the militant left. One testament to this is Russell Little’s words in a documentary film about his group, the Symbionese Liberation Army (SLA) of California. He discusses their fascination with the group and the film “State of Siege” (“*État de Siège*”) and says his own SLA literally took form from a discussion group on political films running in Berkeley. Robert Stone’s “Guerrilla: The Taking of Patty Hearst” (Magnolia Pictures, 2005).

47. Seth G. Jones and Martin C. Libicki, *How Terrorist Groups End: Lessons for Countering al Qa’ida* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2008), chap. 4, “Politics and the FMLN in El Salvador.” The notion that this Cuban-organized group of communists and self-proclaimed armed forces was mainly pushing for “reforms” and “for the transition to a democratic political regime” is comically naïve (*ibid.*, 64). After its defeats at phase-two-style fighting and disarmament under various national and international pressures, the FMLN did morph into a political party and compete in elections, often with a measure of success. A similar error occurs in table A.1 in which the “goal” of the 2nd of June Movement in Germany is declared to be “policy change.” They were anarchists, and later some joined the communist RAF.

48. Phil Peters (Lexington Institute, Arlington, VA), interview by author, 2006. Peters worked on Central American issues for many years in the office of Rep. James A. Courter (R-NJ) on the House Armed Services Committee, where I also had the honor of employment.

49. Donatella della Porta, "Left-Wing Terrorism in Italy," in *Terrorism in Context*, ed. Martha Crenshaw (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995), 121.

50. See Richard Drake, *The Aldo Moro Murder Case* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995), 259, ff.

51. See, for example, Frank Hyland, "Peru's Sendero Luminoso: From Maoism to Narco-Terrorism," *Jamestown Foundation Terrorism Monitor* 6, no. 23 (8 December 2008), [http://www.jamestown.org/programs/gta/single/?tx_ttnews\[tx_ttnews\]=34237&tx_ttnews\[backPid\]=167&no_cache=1](http://www.jamestown.org/programs/gta/single/?tx_ttnews[tx_ttnews]=34237&tx_ttnews[backPid]=167&no_cache=1). The article states that "SL's apparent resurgence may be viewed fairly as an integral part of a burgeoning wave of leftist ideology in Latin America . . . Concern over an SL comeback is well founded." I think these reports are overblown. As a November 2009 briefing at the Marshall Center by a Peruvian lieutenant colonel indicates, the actual area of operations of Sendero today is minuscule and very isolated.

52. Janke, *Guerrilla and Terrorist Organizations*, 7–10.

53. Menachem Begin, trans. Samuel Katz, *The Revolt: Story of the Ergun*, 5th ed. (Jerusalem: Steimatzky, 1972); and Doris Katz, *The Lady was a Terrorist: During Israel's War of Liberation* (New York: Shiloni Publishers, 1953).

54. Janke, *Guerrilla and Terrorist Organizations*, 245–47; and the Jewish Virtual Library, <http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/>.

55. Lord Moyne was a friend of Winston Churchill. After the 1944 murder, the prime minister made a scorching speech in the House of Commons, describing Jewish "terrorism" as evil and risking comparison to acts by Nazi terrorists. This was a principled political posture, the right one, however difficult it must have been for Churchill, well known to be a friend to the Jews since his earliest years in parliament.

56. There have been innumerable terrorist attacks upon those who would ameliorate social and economic problems, and often this is a strategy by the violent. Some of these are a pattern of anti–United Nations terrorism—e.g., today's visible al-Qaeda hatreds of the United Nations. I have written on other such attacks in "The Assault on Aid Workers: A New Pattern in Terrorism," *Security Insights* (January 2008), the first of a new series of policy papers from the Marshall Center.

57. Authorities date the origin of the FMLN differently—1958, 1960, 1961, etc.

58. A more common date of origin for the Tigers is 1976. This author chooses to begin when Velupillai Prabhakaran founded the Tamil New Tigers, 1972. An active terrorist and guerrilla in the next years, he refounded the Tigers as the LTTE in 1976.

59. N17 prospered so long that some began to whisper that the socialist governments of Greece did not care to arrest the terrorists, given the targets they were choosing. Keith Weston, once part of an official British contingent in Greece, disagrees. He believes the extremely small size of the group and the blood connections many had as well ensured secrecy.

60. The Kurdish PKK, the most beguiling of cases, may or may not deserve a place here in section III A. Once easily classified, this protracted insurgency has become an analytical challenge. Founded by Abdullah Ocalan in the mid 1970s and ruled continuously by this charismatic leader, it was decapitated in February 1999 with his arrest and rendition. Kurdish violence all but disappeared for some four years. Ocalan's announcements from jail appeared to dissuade loyalists from terrorism, and no clear successor has appeared. The PKK appeared defeated. Then a shadow came over Turkey's accomplishment; violence by Kurdish militants of unclear loyalty slowly reappeared. The leader's son is an active militant, and new organizations that may or may not be well linked to the old have appeared and are fighting—in Turkey and from Iraq. There is,

for example, the Kurdish Freedom Falcons, which the US State Department initially reported on neutrally and years later began referring to as a militant wing of the PKK. Today one must speak of a phoenix of Kurdish militancy. The US State Department and the government of Turkey see a new chapter in a long PKK life. Either of these different views may be defensible; a historian might well prefer the latter.

61. Ken Duncan, the Marshall Center's Program on Terrorism and Security Studies (PTSS) expert on Middle Eastern states' sponsorship of terrorism, adds that Syria has been successful—a contrast with Libya.

62. Jack Holland, *The American Connection: US Guns, Money, and Influence in Northern Ireland* (New York: Viking, 1987).

63. This unique term *preservationist* is from Bard O'Neill. The term *pro-state terrorist* is inferior because it is less exact; some right-wing groups want to preserve the cultural or political status quo, not necessarily the sitting government, with whose police they often quarrel.

64. Stephen Morris, an Australian scholar and former colleague at the Naval War College, propounded a very useful scheme for beginning study of an insurgent group—analyzing its performance in the overt political, the covert political, and the military realms. If we group terrorist violence in with the third category, the approach has much value for study of organizations such as Hezbollah and HAMAS, and to lesser degrees al-Qaeda.

65. The second source, described as more careful, is the aforementioned Jones/Libicki study dated 2008, which declares on page xiv, "No religious group that has ended achieved victory since 1968." A student of history inclined to think terrorism fails will be most content with the views of and best instructed in studying the works of Walter Laqueur. His decades of fine work, based on many primary sources and varied languages, have set high standards for writing the history of terrorism.

66. The Abu Nidal Organization flourished for a quarter century and killed some 900 people before expiring from combined causes. These culminated in the shooting of the leader in Iraq but included internece violence in the ANO, repudiation by other Palestinians, and a clever US effort in counterterrorism thus far described by almost no one in print; see the chapter on "History" in Tucker, *Skirmishes at the Edge of Empire*.

67. ABC Radio News on 24 January 2009 named a released terrorist who rejoined al-Qaeda. These incidents have occurred perhaps once a year, during the very same years of popular European and American agitation for closure of the detention facility at Guantanamo Bay, on US-controlled land in Cuba.